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I

INTRODUCTION
The development ot the Eighth Amendment to the United
States ColfJSitMtiQD is a significant area of constitutional
growth.

This study tocuses on the recent landmark decision,

Robi.nson v. Oalitorniat J?O

u.s.

660(1962) 1 and subsequent re-

actions in federal and state courts to that decision.

Th• case

has been the vehicle tor the extenaion of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against c:euel and unusual punishment to the states
thJtough the due prooess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The

tacts of the case illustrated judicial reaetion to

the social phenomenon of growing drug addiction in the United
States.

However, the principle that state laws punishing status

alone were unconstitutional has been extended beyond addiction.
Through this investigation, the process of interaction
and adaptation Within the United States legal and constitutional

system has been oba.rved.

The method used has been largely case

analysis.
This is also a study of the scope and impact of the

Btlli.uan decision in lower federal court cases and a representative sample of state cases.
1

2

First, the

i1hin1s>n case has been traced from its begin-

ning in 1960, in the California state and tederal courts to its
1962 decision in the United States Supreme Court.

Then, the cases

which cited RQb:tJ&an were compared for the years between 1962 and
1970.
Between 1962 and 1970 1 there were 349 total cases in the
United States court systems which cited the preoldent ot BAD1D§.OD•

Ot those oases, 266 were decided in the state courts.

In the

federal district and circuit court system, 83 cases were decided.
Through studying the 83 federal eases, tendencies about

the scope and 1.mpa.ot ot

BA~1DIPA

have been not4ld.

Atter the ten-

dencies of the precedent in the federal cases had b"n recognized,
a selected sample of 21 cases from the state court system was

made.

Since these cases followed the same tendencies, the scheme

ot the 83 federal cases has been assumed to be charactenstic ot
the universe ot 349 cases which cited lgbiD&U>D•
Concerning the scope of the decisions, two major trends
have beens

( 1) application ot the principle of Br.a'92.1191h the

Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
to orimes of status1 and, (2) interpretation ot the detision as an
extension of the doctrine ot incorporation, or state's rights.
Regarding the first trend, application ot the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to
Ori.mes ot status, the eases have been divided into six categories.

These aret

(1) narcotic addict1 (2) alcoholic; (3) vagrant1 (4)

hippie; (5) mentally illJ and 1 (6) sex offender.

3
Second• the extension of the Eighth Amendment to the
states through the due process clause ot the Fourteenth Amendment
has been found in cases which have ineluded the three phrases of
the Eighth Amendment•

(a) prohibition against denial ot bail; (b)

prohibition aga1net levJing of excessive tines; and• (c) prohibi•
tion against cruel and unusual punishment.
Besides crimes of .status, which have bffn grouped separately in the paper, the third classification of prohibitions has
been li.nked to criminal sentences.
has been cited.

Especd.ally the death penalty

Also, prohibition agnnst unfair procedul"es in

prisons and racially-motivated puniahmant ot conVicted persons
..

have been said to be within the meaning ot Bsa'Q1.u.tn•
Concerning the impact of

lg~i;sg;,

the results of the

federal and state cases have been critical reaction to the prinoiple of not punishing status.

Through subtle interpretations of

th• holding in the Supreme Court decision, l<>wer tedenl and
state Qourts have circumvented the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment..

Because of the iavolved

reasoiU.ng to achieve the holding in the Supreme Court opinion,
later courts have been able to extract many d1tferent procedures
tor settling issues based on laws which punish crimes ot status.

Supplementing the case analyses determining the scope and
impact of

BAR~IRDt

preparation for the study has included collec-

tion of data about the tradition ot punishment for crimes of
status.

This information has been drawn from anthropologi.cal,

philosophical and sociological sources as well as legal ones.

4

Attention has been paid to law review articles and notes,

also.

liowever1 appraisals ot the history ot the Eighth Amendment

and of the tuture importance of the Rg];liQCiQD decision have been
lacking in that literature.

Consequently, in this study, which has been baaed on
actual decision-making withi.n the legal pl"Ocess. speculative
journalism about possible, alternative reasoning in the Supreme
Court opinion has not been p•rtinent.

Also,

atto~neys•

theories

about !orms of treatment tor persons conVicted of crimes ot status
have not been relevant i.n t.Paoing the development and application

ot the prine1ple of not punishing cruelly or unumiallY•
Inetead. 1 the pri.ma:117 goal ot this paper has been to establish trends about this new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
Sine~

its application to the states through the case ot Robinson

v. California, 370

u.s.

660(1962), the prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment has been reconsidered and enlB.l."'pd;
although, it has not been accepted completely.

It is the para-

meters of scope and impact within which the Eighth Amendment has
been reasserted that have been described.

ROBINSON

II

CALIFORNIA, 370 U.S. 660(1962)

v~

Thi ga11tQEmaa St!1it Gd F.ls&1taJ.,CQYJ(ts
The begi.nning ot the Robinson v. Ca.litornia, 370

u.s.

660

(1962), landmark Supreme Court decision occurred in the trial
court ot the Cit7 of Loa Angel•a, Los Angeles County, ot the State

ot Calitonia.

On J\U'l8 9 1 1960, after one day ot bearings, a jury
'
ot twelve returned a verdict of guilty ot narcotic addiction. 1
Having been anaigned February 4, 1960, tor violation ot
Section 11721 ot the State Health and Safety Code, 2 a misdemeanor,
1•cierk•s Transcript• Doek•t Entries," Transcript ot
Record. lln~itf St1t11 Rl&Kt.H ctVJ!t B:Ji1.C1 amt Butdl1 ;,zo Ile§•
g6QCJ962l; P•

•

.

2The statute was: ••No person shall use, or be under the
infiuence ot, or be addicted to the use ot narcotics, excepting
when administered by or under the direction of a person lioensed
by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be
the burden of the defense te show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted ot violating any provision of this
section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall b• sentenced to serve
a term ot not less than 90 ~s nor more than one 7ear in the
county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on
probation for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all
cases in whioh probation is {P:'anted require as a condition thereof
that such a person be confined in the county jail for at least 90
days. In no event does the court have the power to absolve a
person who violates this section from the obligation of spending
at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail." Robinson v.
California, 370 u.s. 661(1962).
5
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Lawrence Robinson was not sentenced• but placed on probation tor
two years With the f'irat 90 days of that time to be served in the

county jail.3 Also, he was to take a Nalline test4 whenever his
probation officer requested.a to work; to obey the law; and, to be
under the general superv!Gion of the probation officer and the
co~t.5

Then, on June 27 1 1960 1 an appeal t1t0m the Municipal Court
ot the Los Angeles Jud1e1al District ot the City of Los Angeles
of the Superior Court ot
ca11tornia in the City of Loa Angeles. 6 However, the revie'Wi.ng

was tiled. in th• Appellate

De~tment

court. the highest state eourt having jurisdiction, affirmed the
earlier conViction of the trial oourt.
!he brief tor the appeal to the Superior CoUl't stated that
the ordinance under which Lawrence Robinson had been eonv1cted,

Section 1l?Z1 ot the cal.1torn1a Health and Safety Code, was unconstitutional,

The first of ten reasons given tor the unconstitu-

tionality was that, in addition to being ••vague, indetinite and

3uuta §t1tu §m»:nt Glurt ~ta arua Rmfia, P• 6.
4ifai11ne is the phamaoologiea.l trademark to:zi "nalorphine•• •

which is used to nullify resyiratory depression du• to narcotics
and tor diagnosis ot addiction to narcotics. Jess Stein, ed.
~ot,.BPuuat1'1Qft:U gft~t•,k&l:t.ft J.;Anaaa, unabridged Edition
n orkt
om use 1 9 'l , P• 9 9.

5va&Jcd
st1'u s;snin•
•
6
tQ:t.i• • P• 9•

stam It&•(• .au •111d•1

P•

6•

7
uncertain 1 "7 the ordinance denied Robinson•s "rights to Equa.1 Protection and to Due Process under the federal and state eonstitutions. n8

The second reason alleged that eVidenee gained ·oy an nunreasonable search and seizure and selt•incJ'1mination••9 had intlu-

enoed the decision and had been "admitted over the detendant•s
objections by the trial eourt.n 10

The thil'd point was that the "court miadir•eted the jury
in matters of law.n11
The fourth said "aeveral causes ot action are improperly

joined 1n a 81.ngle oount.• 12
The titth wae that "the court erred in tailing to submit
the factual question re probable ea.use to the jury.*' 1'
The sixth charged. that the court had been in erMr by
assisting the

City Attorney to prepare tor th• expert t••ttmony.

The seventh repeated that admissions and oonle""'1ons which
had not been voluntaJ'Y w.re used in the trial,

The eighth said that '*the verdict and judgment were contrary to law and to the ertdenoe." 14
The ninth called the use by the ju17 of a magnifying glass
to view evidence in photographs an error.

The tenth ea.id the "oourt erred in not attirmatively giv·
ing the defendant the opportunity to poll the jury." 15
7 IQi.,4., P• 109,

12Xb'd•

13IbJ.d.

10

I:b3.Se
15'11Ma

11

X9,sa

8
At that stage ot the case, the appeal relied on the Fourth
Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their pe!"sons,
houses• papers. and ettects, against uunasonable searches and
seizures.n 16 The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment was not introduced in the briet prepared tor
the Superior Court of Oal.itornia.

However, the Memorandum Opinion trom the Appellate Depart-

ment ot the Superior Court did pJl"eQnt the possiblt viability ot
the Eighth Amendment in the d.iaouaaion of the rejection of the
appeal from the trial eout oonYiction.

On March 31. 1961, the

Appellate Department of the Superior Court tiled a Memorandum

.

Opinion which replied that the court had "held in a number of
oases that the section (11721) is constitutiona1• 17
This court has held in a number of cases that the section
is constitutional. In b'"t•r•'EfiDl(1959), our er.A. '4.06Z,
we said: •There is no men n e claim Cot appellant) that
Health and Safety Code 11721 is unconstitutional b4H:auee it
makes being a narcotic addict a misdemeanor.• To the eame
effect i•
Rla1ti(1960) 1 our er. A. 1J1+22• We shall,
therefore, o ow he ru • ot stare dec1s1s. 1

1lifl'·xt

Next, the opinion introduced the reasoning which became
the major argument in the BAai.uaon appeal to the United. States
Supreme Court.

Presenting a rejoinder to its own first point, the

16U;;t.tl<I
17

ia:t.11.~iciiiatS.Ou, Amendment IV, clause (a).

um.:td l:ti1i11 Iv.ma• QQ»i:t »riab. m Bt1Ad1. P• 111.

18

1Pisla

9
court mentioned a.n e:::rample of an ordinance "which made it a misdemeanor to be a common drunk.ardn 19 having been declared unconstitu-

tional by a California court.

0

In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786

( 196o) • held that Penal Code 647 subsection 11 • •• was so vague an<

uncertain that it was uneonstitutiona1.n 20
Explaining itiHtlt, the ccurt speculated that the precedent

ot &D rt NIJ(btlll
might cause the higher courts to review the cl'ime ot being a
narcotic addict or any crime of status. Although at present
no a~ lies fl'om the appellate depaJ:"tment ot the Superior
Court-to the Distriot Court ot Appeal or the Supi-eme Court,
yet habeas oox-pus li•s to test the const1tut1onalit!1ot the
section in question. We would welcome such a teet •.

Then, J!'esponding to the·second point
appeal, the evidence obtained through

in the

u~asonable

cietendant•s
sea.rob and

seizure, the Superior Coux-t said that the Municipal Court had
"aoted properly in reeeiving this evtdence outside the presence of
the jury.n22
In People v. S.org, (1955), 45 Cal. 24 776 11 the oovt said at
p. 781; •The probative value of evidence obtained b7 a search
and seizure, however, does not depend on whether the search
and seiZll.l'*e was legal. or illegal, and no purpose would be
served !~ hartng the ju;ry make a second determination of that
issue.•
191Q;W,
20Di4t
21 IbiQ, (William Butler Eldridge presents the status
laws which existed in Galitornia, the District ot Columbia,
Illinois• Michigan, and New Jersey, in H~aj~ll a~,~a Lf1
(Chicago1 Un1vers1ty of Chicago Press, 19 7 1 PP• 9- O •

3

221QM!1
2
B~tfl

3°Reply Brief of Appellee,''

tmsl B1cfldi, P• 2,

Un;i,~td SifA!«•i RJ.U>rllll QQY.£:&

10

Concerning the seven remaining issues in the brief, the
court said they had no merit.

In conclusion, the opinion affirmed

the Municipal Court order granting probation after 90 days in jail
and denying a motion for a new trial.
Again

in

the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of

the City of Los Angeles, an order tor a rehearing of the case of
People or the State ot Calitorniat plaintiff and respondent,
versus Lawrence Robinson, defendant and appellant, was entered.
The rehearing was d•nied on April 11, 1961. 24
Also 1

a.s

directed in the Memorandum Opinion, the "appellan

tried ••• to secure habeas oorpus relief in the District Court of
Appeal and the California Supreme Court. 02 5 Both petitions were
unsuccesstu1. 26

A notice ot appeal to the Supreme Court

or

the United

States from the final order of the Superior Court of the Stn.te of
California on March 3 1 1961 1 was tiled June 26, 1961. 2 7 The appeal
was made in accordance with 28 United St01.tes Code Section 1257(2).

24ncalendar n Transcript ot Record. Un~ttd St1~1s Supremt
1
4
1..wi1....,,:,,...;;....,..~;:,....;::;.a.:.wa....-R.ui..-....,..lloilllit 370 U.S. 660(1962) 1 P• 1T_,,
2

~obinllJOn v, California, 370

26 Ib1d

u.s.

664(1962).

1

27°Calendar," Transcript of Record, P• 114.

11
The provision from the Federal ».claratory Judgment Act allowed fol
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court since the appellant had exhauete<
a.11 state remedies. 28

The transcript ot the record ot the controversy between
Lawrence Robinson and the State ot California was tiled and an
order noting probable jurisdiction was entered November 20 1
1961. 29 Bamu.el Carter McMorris tiled the opening briet on behalf

ot appellant Robinson.
In the introduction• the appeal stated the goal ot the
argument I
The remedy which we here seek, would delete! at least, the
addiction phrase ot section ~11,721 1 without dong violence to
the aots ot use or being under the influence ot a nareot1e 1 as
such 1 and would tree the statute books ot Califo~ ot the
last remaining vestige of the crime ot vagrancy.
'?he questions presented by the appftal began with th• state••nt that &action 11721 ot the California Health and Safety Code
was in violation ot the appellant's rights under.the FoUJ'teenth
Amendment to the United States Cql§titutJ,p.3 1 That wa. the reascn
"Not1ce of Apfeal to the Supreme Court•" SIDi~M §ta.t11
P• 114.
29Robinson v. California, 368 u.s, 918(1961),
28

su12am1

Qlut »ci1tl u Btl.RSl11

30"Proposed Statement on Appeal

n

(Appellant•s Briet),

Uu:t.\!d §\1\11 S;;DaM 9am:1i.i£11t1 and. 61;g;ds, P• 115.

31united States s<Gjl%iiu~1.Qui Amendment XIV, Section 11

ttNo State shall make or en~orce any aw which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities ot citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person ot lit•• liberty, or property,
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection ot the laws."

12

which had been given in the statement on appeal to the Superior
Court o t Calitonia.

llowever, the subsequent form ot the brief was new.

Instea<

ot proceeding to the point of unlawful sea.rob and seizure, the
reasoning developed the basis of the argument against punishment
of status.

Capital.izing on the suggestion from the opinion

or

the

Superior Court ot Ca.litorn1a1. the appeal brief states three vmys
in which the statute punishecU

( 1) a status 1 not an act or omis-

sion; (2) an involuntQ11 status1 (3) a condition ot mental and
physical illness.
Besides pun18h:1ng status, or a.a involuntary condition, the
statute was said to be ''vague, imletinite and

uncertain.•32 Thia

point had been made in the appeal to the Superior Coot of ca11tornia1 also.

Furthermore, the statute was "an unwarranted. and unconstitutional infringement of treed.om ot movement•"'' Alrf' pe~son
entering the State ot California who had ever been a napcot1c
addict was liable for arrest under the statute.
Sinae the statute could have punished a pel'aon who had
been a narcotic addict at any time in the past, it was said to be

ex post :ta.cto 1 too.

Cai.£~

3Z"Proposed

Statement on Appeal,"
ijrit'I !Jl.Q B•gQJ;ilt P• 115•
33

X'.R:i.4a

llnJ.tlSI

Stat!!

Slimr:tu

13

Finally, the eighth subpoint under the major question
raised in the brief' wast

"'It imp0ses cruel and unusual pun1sh-

ment. n34 The Eighth Amendment to the United States 2Qnsflj,'tJltila
was introduced, although not directly stated.

At that time, there

would not have been precedent for rrd.sing the issue of the applicability ot the Eighth Amendment through the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Then, the second major question was that Of evidence
obtained th.rough unr•ason.able. search and seizure.,
Third, the quest1on ot procedural due proc•as hartng been
lacking in the conYiction was repeated.

.

That issue had been

phrased in terms ot conflict between the law and the evidence in
the appeal to the California Superior Court.
More fully described in the brief to the Supreae Court,
the argument was as tollona
(1) There was no evidence whatso•v•r
a narcotic or addiction to a nareotie.
(2) The only conceivable ev1dence ot
sions of the defendant and not as a part
(3) There was no proof of the use o.t
The development a.nd

substant1atj~on

of either influence o '
venue wa.a by admis-

ot the eol'Ju•

d•lict~ 1

an ill•gal narcotic.;,·

of the questions rested

on fifty cases drawn from both the state and federal courts.
Generally, the citations applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states.

One illustrative ease dated frrom January 4. 1926.

In

14

Connally v. General Construction Company, 269

u.s.

385(1962), Mr.

Justice Sutherland spoke tor the court.
The constitutional grounds of attacit. among others, are
that the statutory provisions it entoroed. 1 will deprivpla1ntitf, its otticere, agents and repreattntatives, ot their
liberty and property Without due process ot law, in Violat~gn
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution •••

Concerning point "(8} It Imposes Cruel and. Unusual Punishment, n37 the :reasoning wass
The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution and
Article I, M<h 6 Of the Ca,lifornia Constitution. both prohibit cnel and unusual punisluaent,
A penalty is GPU.el when it shooks the moral sense and outrages those innate principles ot humanity which hav• been
broadened and expanded by,e1vilized enlightenment. Finley,
In re, 1 a.A. 198 at 104. .

Futhermore,
(a) statute may be unoonstitutional upon its face oz- in its
application. By necessary implication, since no provision is
made tor the tapering oft ot the condition and since the court
may take judicial notice of \'that bappens in •oold tvkey' with·
drawala we :re-submit that the law here involved is uoonst1•
tution;! both upon its tace and in its application. To negative this p0sition it is necessary tor aprll•• to ahOw that,
although no proviaion tor humane treatmen of addietion of
inc.arcerated addicts is provided in the law, sueh in taet is
the practice of the California authorities. ~· ot course,
would be impossible for appellee to establimi.

36Connally v. General Construction Co~, 269 U.S.
388(1926).
&.!2~~

-'~ 0 Propcsed Statement on Appeal," Un~§l!l AUi&>ts §u'Ql•M
~Cit§ And Rt;QrSlt P• 115.
384bid1;

39wg,, P• 9.

15

In reply, the brief

or

the appellee, the People ot the

State of California, was tiled by Roger .Arnebergh, the City Attorney of Los Angelesi Philip E,. Grey, the Assistant City Attorney,
and W1.lli.am E. Doran, the D&puty City Attor11ey.

In five major

answers to th& three main questions raised by the appellant

1.:n

his

op•ning brief, the attorneys for the Stat• of California defended

the constitutionality of Section 11721 ot the California Health
and Safety Code.
Pirat, in response to the question ot denial of due procesl!
and equal

protection of the la\1'8 under the Fourteenth Amendment,

the appellee's briet stated that S.ction 117Z1 was "a proper

exercise ot the police power."40
In defense ot the pOa1t1on 1 ·the state cited recent hold-

ings,
l!!A~ll !t 1}~,(1959)t OUll' CRA 4062, we saidt •There is
no rneri 1nhec aim that Health and Safety Code 11721 is
unconstitutional beeause it makes being a narcotic addict a
misdemeanor. ' To the aw eftec t is b.,Q:RJ.1 X• »lf:U,Dt. ( t 96o) •
our ORA. 4422. We shal.1 1 therefore, follow the Jiu e or stare
decisis•••
Appellant also claims that the court er~d in not submitting as to whether the searoh and seizure was lawtul ••• In
People v. Geo:rg,(1955), 45 Cal. 2d 776. the court said at P•
7811 •The probative value ot evidence obtained by a search
and .seiztll'e, however, does not depend on whether the search
and seizure was legal or illegal, and no purpose would be
served ijf having the jury' make a second determination of that
issue.'

li·00 Reply Brief of Appellee," Yn4.itsl §t;g.t11 Sym;Qt Q.Qw.:i
Bi:j.t(§ Mi Bldnilt P• lOa

4 11QiQ1 ' P• 2.,

16

Second, the brief denied each of the eight reasons alleged
in the appellant's brief to show the unconstitutionality ot the
statute with reference to its punishing a status.
Answering point (8) charging cruel and unusual punishment,
the reply brief elaborated on the leniency of the punishment stipu•
lated in Section 11?21.

V1olat10n ot Section 11721 ot the CalitoJl>lla Health and
Safety Code nsults 1n punishment of not less than 90 days nor
more than one ytu 1n the county jail.. Anellant himselt as
a :result of his conviot1on was placed on probation tor two
ye~• subject to certain terms, inoludtng 90 daya to be served
in the county jail. C4trtatnly such sentence could not be considered cruel or unusual (Weea v. u.s.). Purthel"mOre, the
•cruel and. unusual' pun19hment provisions ot the Eighth Amendment to th• United States Constitution ar. not made applioable
to the states by the Four'teenth Am9ndmen42 (Penear v. Mass ••
Weems v. v.s., eupa•t Bartkus v. . n1.),
Third, in reply to the second major questi.on in the appel-

lant's opening brief, the State of Qalifornia denied. that Robinson
had been subjected to an illegal search and seizure.
Fourth 1 alee in SUpJJOrt ot the reasonablenea ot th• evidence being uEMd in the tna.1. the a.ppellee briet reiterated•
California's excluaionary rules do not tall short et providing
the protection afforded by the Fo~th and Fc:nivteenth Amendment1
to the Un1.ted St.ates Constitution. ~
In the fifth section, the State ot California succinctly
concluded that the evidence was "sufficient to support the judgment. "44
Summarizing the main point• of the argwaent in :reply to
the appeal1 the brief repeated:

"Section 11721 does not impose

17

cruel or unusual punishment ri.thin the long understood meaning ot

the term.n45
Seventy-five oases of authority ._.. cited 1n the text of
the appellee brief for the State of Galifornia.46

Then, in the appellant•s reply brief to the appellee•s
brief and in the oral a.pgument before the Supreme Court on April
171 1962, Samuel ea.z.te McMonts i-enewed the two central ideas.
These nret

( 1) Seetion 11721 made an involunt'81'7 status a cr1me;

and, (.2) the statute punished a condition ot mental and physical
111n.ess•47

.

In his oral argument, William

z.

Doran tor the State ot

Calitornia1 denied that Section 11?21 punished a status or that

the statute was vague.48
On June 25; 1962t the Supreme Court deci$1.on
V•

California• 370

u.s.

660(1962)• was given,

on

Robinson

The CoUPt held that

Section 11?2.1 ot the California Health and Safety Cod.ea. which
punished a status• was uneonstitutional through the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment macle applic-

able to the state through the due process clau• of th• Fourteenth
Amendment•

4'1W•t P• 91
rs- ·--::

46nTable ot Authorities Cited•" Jbg1Jia4 §tat11 Sa»11111
-~~ And BMRHlt P• iii.

t:t......c

4?Robinson v. California, 8 L. Ed, 758(1962)• Annotations.

PP• 1079-lOSO.,

48iaii•t P• 1080,
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Mr. Justice Stewart gave the opinion of the Court. He
wrote tor Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan, in

addition to himselr.49 Justioes Douglae and Harlan presented •Pa.rate coneu.rring opinione.50 Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part
in the conside:ration or deoision.5 1

Mr. Justice Stewai-t noted the question raised

by

Bs>b3.DIQQ•

We noted probable jurisdiction ot this appeal, 368 u.s.
918(1961)• because it squarely presents the iaaue whether the
statute as construed by the California courts in this case_;!s
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment ot the Constitution.

Then, Mr. JusUo• Stewart affirmed 0 (t)he broad power of a
State to regulate the narcotio drugs traffic within its borders."5~

Also, he diSOu88$d the permissible fOJ:"ms ot regulation Wbi.eh a
state could uae.

A State might impose criminal sanctions, tor -.sample,
against the unauthorized manufacture, rrescription. sale, purchase, or pGsnsaion ot narcoties \fi~h n its bordea. In the
interest ot discouraging the Violation of such laws, or in the

.
49Potter Stewart, Ohio(1915-) 1 appointed b:y Pnfid•nt
Eis•nhower(1958-)• Earl ianen1 Republican, Cal1tonta(1891-),

appointed by Pres~ent E1senhowr(1953-1969J•

Hugo L. Black

»em.ocratl Alabama(1886-), aJPl)inted b7 President Roonvelt(t93?-).
William .,. Brennan, Jr., New York(1906-), appoint•d bf President
Eisenhower( 1956-) •

o.

Douglas. hmoorat, Conneeti1ut(t898-) 1 apJohn Marshall Harlan, New
appointed by President E1senhower(195.5-).

'°w1111am

pointed by President Rooseveit0939-).

York(1899-) 1
!>1Feltx hankturter, Indfl>$ndent 1 Massachusetts(1939-1965),
appointed by President Roosevelt(1939-19o2).
'2Robinson v, California, 370 tr.s. 664(196.2).

''Nd·
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interest of the general health or welfare ot its inhabitants,
a State might establish a program ot compulsory treatment tor
those addicted to narcotics. Such a program ot treatment
might require periods ot involuntary confinement. And penal
sanctions might be imposed for failul"e ~ comply with established compulsory treatment procedures.
In addition to the specific ways of handling narcotic
drugs trattic by controlling the individual users, the Court proposed general social welfare campaigns aimed at the total population of the state.

Mr. Justice Stewart hypothesized that narcotic

traffic and addiction could be controlled best by "efforts to
ameliorate the economic and social conditions under which those
evils might be thought to tlotll*ish.u55
Finally• in the opinion "Of the Court, Section 11?21 was
tta statute which (made) the •status' of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense, for which the offender (might) be prosecuted at
any time before he reform(ed),u5 6 The statute was said. to convey
guilt whether or not the person had acted.57
Explaining the meaning ot the statute, Mr. Justice Stewart
then began to reason by analogy.

Comparing what the statute would

have held for persons in a similar condition. the justice observeds
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a aereon to be
mentally~ll, or a leper• or to be afflicted with a venereal
disease.
Citing Francis v, Resweber, 329

541b4g,, 664,5.
571.~

58rb~g.

55

rb~•• 665,

u.s.

•

459(1946), he said:

20

in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made
a criminal offense ot such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction ot cruel and unusual pun;c
ishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ~
Next, the opinion repeated that the statute punished a
status which was recognized by the Court to be an illness.

Quot-

ing the brief of the State in a footnote, the justice recalled:
1

Thirty-seven years ago this Court recognized that persons addicted
to narcotics •are diseased and proper subjects for (m.edieal) treatment.• Linder v. u.s. .268 u.s. 5,18." 60
1

Then, the holding in

BIJ:a~DllD

was&

a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted (with an
illness) as a criminal, even though he has never touthed any
narcotie drug within the Sts:te or been guilty of aJ11 irregular
behaVier there, 1ntl1ots a cruel and uftysual punish.ntent in
violation ot tne Fourte•nth .Amendment.
Concluding the opinion ot the Court 1 Mr. Justice Stewart
acknowledged that "the narcotics trattic has occasioned the grave
concern of govern:ment. 062 However, he admonished the states to

*'leg1timately"63 manage that concern.
Finally; Ms-. Justice Stewart's closing statement narrowed

the future impact of the decision.

He said that the Court had

dealt "in this case only with an individual provision ot a pa.rticu•
la.rized local law as it has so tar been interpreted by the California courts."64
Mr Justice Douglas concurred with the Court in a separate,

59;t;iU·
62niu.

61 IQid., tn. 8, 667.

64Iiisia
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longer opinion.

Essentially agreeing with what had been said by

Mr. Justice Stewart, the concurrence by Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized the development ot the concept of cruel and unusual punish-

111ent.
Tracing the priDlitive methods of curbing unwanted behaVior 1
which were used from the Stxt..nth Century in England, to those of
the present, Mr. Justice Douglas compa!'ed disea•, eapeeially
mental illness, With narcotic addiction. 65
After graphicall.7 describing some of the pQ'aical ettects
of narcotic addiction• Mr. Justice Douglas introduced the method

ot treatment currently practiced in Great Britain• Admitting that
~

the Inglish approaoh was not more than eustom in his Qgument, he,
nevertheless, emphasized the contradictory point ot vin held by
California. 66
Next, the eomplexity ot narcotic addiction was explored.

Mr. Justice Douglas covered the preaent lack of knowledge ot how
to cure narcotic addiction and the respense of the community to
that frustration.67
Again, returning to citations of the hi.stoi-io meaning ot
cruel and unusual pun1ahment 1 Mr. Justice Douglas demanded that
the progressive "•nlightenmentn68 concerning insanity be transferred to narcotic addiotion 1 aleo.69

66

nu,,
6'nu.

6?3.

2.2

Finally, Mr. Justice Douglas said that ''convicting, tt?O n.ot
the actual "eontinement,n?l was cruel and unusual punishment.
YJl'". Justice ~lan

opinion.

concurred with the Court in a short

However, the separate statement urged caution in

as~>,l·

a.ting narcotic addiction With illness and in excluding narcotic

addiction from aubjeetion to criminal law.72

Hie agreement with the nversal ot th•

~lier

California

Supe:M.or Court deeiaion was baaed on the nckl•ssneu ot the trial
court instruotions to the jur,-. •(f)he effect ot this instruction
was to authonze orimtnal punishment tor a bare desire to commit a

.

criminal act."73 To Mr. Justice Harlan 1 the California statute
which would allow that finding would be "an arbitrary impOsition
which excedes the power that a State ma1 exercise in enacting its
criminal law.n74

Mr. Justice Clark dissented from the opinion of the Court
in which Section 11721 ot the California Health and Safety Code
was "violative of due process as •a cruel and unusual punishment.• "75 His dissent reflected knowledge of the California
hearings a.nd recommendations to the legislature which

~ceded

a

Governor•s veto ot a bill to repeal the statute.?6 However, Mr.

?Oz:g14,
74w.4,

71

lla141,
75:u1isi,

72

D>idu 678.
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Justice Clark did not report that the Governor's veto overrode the
sentiraent ot the California legislature which had voted in tavor
of repeal et the statute.77
Next, }1.r. Justice Clark mentioned the protective nature of
handling the narcotic addict in the State ot California.

He

praised the aoo1olog1cal merit of the Ca11tol"n1a laws pertaining
to narcotic addiction.
Although the sootion is penal in a.ppearanoe-perhaps a carryover from a l•s• aopbist1cated approach--its present provisioni:
are quite sin.d.lar to those IOJ:' civil commitment and treatment
of addicts Who have loat the power of self-control, and its
present purpose is retleet-1 in a statement which closely
follows Secti.on 117211 •'!'he rehabilitation of narcotic addictE
and the pnvention ot oontin.u.ed addiction to narcotics is a
matter ot atateWid.•7sonoern.4 California Health and Sat•ty
Code Section 11728.
.
Pursuing an extensive argument in support of California

laws which wer• ea.id to be adequate to the problem and superior to
the Supreme

CoUl"t

direction, Mr. Justice Clark dift$1"9d moat

aharply with the portion of the majority opinion which he said
recommended hospitaliZation tor addiction.

U. argued that the

treatment existed already.79

Then, he doubted that punishment of status was c!'Uel and
unusual punishment, anyway.
The tact that Section 11?21 might be labeled •criminal' seems
irrelevant, not only to the majority•s own. •treatment• test
but to the •conoept of ordered liberty• to ~ich the States
must attain under the FoU!'teenth Amendment.
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rir. Justice Clark concluded that tteven if the overall statutory scheme is ignored and a purpose and effect of punishment 1s

attached to Section 11721• that provision still d.oes not violate
the Fourteenth .Amendment.n8 1 "Moreover• •status• offenses hat"::;
long been known and X'QCOgnized in the criminal law.
Commentaries(Jones ed. 1916) 170.n82
1

4 Blackstone,

1

Finally; he disagreed. with the appropriateness of invoking
the cruel and unusual punishment clause ot th• Eighth Amendment.
"Properly constl'Ued1 the statute provides a treatment rather than
a

punishment."8'
Mit. Justice White dissented., also.

He did not concur in

giving standing to the ca• Which raised the issue ot the conatitu•
tionality of a state statute.

In his opinion; the decision was

Alsot it invalidated. a state statute. Mr. Justice
White did not approve ot that interterence. 84 "Calitol*nia is
unnecessary.

entitled to have its statute and the record so read•••"85

M:r. Justice White also concurred with Mr. Justice Clark
that the statute was not being used to punish an involuntary condi·
tion. 86 Then• he said that even if the status were involuntary,
"(t)he Court recogniZas no degrees of addiction.'*8?
Deploring the application o:r the Fourteenth Amendment• Mr.
Justice White speculatedt
81
85

:U2i4e

J:la~t,

82

w.4.,

686.

86

684.

ia~4M

83112uu 685.
84~lh~a,,
87 l'b14a.t 688.
687.
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The Fourteenth Amendment is todo.y held to bar any prosecution
tor addiction regerdleas of the degree or trequeney ot use•
and the Court&~ opinion brintles With indications ot further
consequences.

He tea.rod that the Court had "effectively removed Cali-

tornia • s power to deal effectively with the reourring case under
the statute whefte there is ample evidence of uatt but no ev1dence

ot the precise location ot use.n89 "Beyond this it has cast serious doubt upon the power ot any State to toPbid the use of narcotic s
under t~at of criminal punishment.rt90

Furthwmen, the new application of the Eighth

~ndment

was said to be ina.ppt'Opri.ate bffauee ot lack of preffdent.9 1
Pi.nallYt he said that ti. Court had dealt in matters

better lett to "either the States or Congreas ... 92 Mr. Justice
White did not aeeept the Court•s "own abstract notions of how best
to handle the nareotics problem.• n93

88Ib~,

92:u••si.

III

ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE AND RAMIFICATIONS
OF B>.llINSOlf
~it

ftQ!Q.bitiqn

As1+n§t

funigtQ.qs StatJag

Between 1962 and 1970, a major trend found in the cases
citing the precedent of Bobinsan has been the application ot the
principle ot the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment to crimes of ctatus.

The federal cases analyzec

have been divided among six categories.

These are:

(1) narcotic

addict; (2) alcoholic; (3) vagrant; (4) hippie; (5) mentally ill;
and, (6) sex offender.
The following discussion has been organized to show the
chronological development ot decisions within each category.
Through the observation ot the reliance upon the precedent of
Rgb.D§OQ, the wide scope and diverse ramifications

or

the Supreme

Court decision have become obvious.
Until 19?0, in the United States federal court system,
there had been twenty-two cases which dealt with some question ot

narcotics and that referred directly to Rgpig§QD•
been in the federal district courts.

Six cases have

Sixteen eases have been

decided in the federal circuit courts of appeals.

r-1ost of the case•
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have been attempts to clarify the ruling about the status ot narcotic addicts and to extend the

~obin§OD

decision to other facets

ot the narcotics issue.
The six federal district court cases between 1962 and 1970
were brought in six different courts of the ninety-one districts.
They were civil claims based upon federal law.

Five of the six

petitions were requestins write of habeas corpusJ all five were
rejected.

One of the six

pet1tio~s

was an action for a decla=atory

judgment and an injunction; that was denied, also.
In none ot the district

~ases

was the direct application

ot the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-

ishment :made to a similar tactual situation.
influence

or

N~vertheless,

the Rgbinsgn decision was present.

the

The bases tor

attempting to gain writs and a declaratory judement were the
Supreme Court ruling •
. Also, the acknowledgment

was positive.

or

the ruling in the

Bob~Jl§On

cas

The courts agreed that the Supreme Court had invali

dated Section 11721 ot the California Health

~nd

Safety Code which

punished the .status of narcotic addiction.

In the first district court case, Diaz v. California, 217
F. Supp. 47!3(1963), the plaintiff, Manuel.Diaz said that his
detention at the California Rehabilitation Center, Chino, California, was illegal because the arrest by San

Die~o

narcotics

officers was made on the basis ot the void Section 11721 ot the
Health and Safety Code in direct violation

or

the Robinson decisi
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However, the judge did not comment on the substantive meri
of that assertion.

Instead, he denied the petition tor a writ of

habeas corpu.s on procedural grounds. 94
Quoting from Section 2254 ot Title 28 United States Code
Amended, the Federal Regulatory Act, he explained, in parts

An application tor a writ of habeas corpus in behalf ot a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant h~
exhausted the remedies available in the courts ot the State. 5
The second petition tor a writ of habeas corpus was that

ot the State of Louisiana ex rel. Ernest Htq"es v. Allgood, 254 F.
Supp. 913(1966).

In denying the writ, District Judge West "held

that a statute making it unlawful •to be or become• a drug addict
did not constitutie cruel and unusual punishment in violation ot
the constitutional prohibition."96
While indicating acceptance ot the Rqbi;s;n precedent, the
judge differentiated between the California statute and the pertinent Louisiana statute.
Citing the case ot State ot Louisiana ex rel. Blouin v.
Walker, 244 La. 699(1963) 1 he recalled:

(T)he Louisiana Supreme Court held in §lQU~ll that the ~insgn
decision was not applicable to the Louisiana statute.
e
United States Supreme Court agreed, and on JanuaJ11 131 1964,
denied certiorari. Watkins v. Walker, 375 U.S. 988(1~64).
94n1az v. California, 217 F. Supp. 479(1963).

95J;b~sJ1
96state ot Louisiana ex rel. Ernest Hayes v. Allgood, 254

P. Supp. 913(1966),

29
In both the BlQYiD case and this case, the petitioners
were convicted ot drug addiction, were given suspended sentences on condition that they go to a hospital for medical
relief, and after violating their probation, we~' sentenced to
serve time in the Louisiana State Penitentiary.
The holding supported the rights ot states to provide
their own legal sanctions and to determine criminal behavior.

In the case ot Burmeister v. New York City Police Department, 275 F. Supp. 690(1967), plaintiffs, "Peter Burmeister,
Ronald Johnson and James Hutchinson11 98 requested "action for
declaratory judgment and injunctive reliet.n 100
Judge Tenney ot the southern District ot New York settled
the case in a form similar to that in Diaz v. Calitornia 1 217 F.
Supp, 478(1963).

Be based hie opinion on procedural grounds:

failure to raise a substantial federal question and to exhaust
state remedies. 101
Pierce v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289(1967), the second 1967
case 1 was a habeas corpus proceeding, also.

Among the facts

or

the case was the situation of a second-degree murder charge "involving a glue-sn1tt1ng episode during which (the) defendant
allegedly attempted to stab ghosts while the lights were out.n 102

97112w •• 914.
98Burme1ster v. New York City Police Department, 275 F.
Supp. 690(1967).

99 isi4·

100

iRi41

101

Ih14a

10 2 Pieree v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289(1967).

The admission ot glue-sniffing was central to the request tor a
writ of habeas corpus on the basis of BQR1D§S2n!03
Since the trial court had given "instruction applying the
modern M•Naghten test ot legal 1nsanity,tt 104 the defendant said
that the case had "moved beyond the bounds of due process010 5 and
had "rendered it one of cruel and unusual punishment."t06

The

thrust ot the argument was that the insanity test implied the
question of involuntary behavior which had been the ~aais tor the
R,Qbinsgn decision.
Judge Christensen ot the district court disagreed.
reasoning, the judge referred to RQbiDl52D• He saidi

In his

"punishment

~

ot a status, as suoh, apart from th• commission With specific
intent ot an att1rmat1ve criminal act ••• (was) not involved or
reached in this case.n 107
The sentence had been tor judgment ot a criminal action,
not tor the condition ot insanity through glue-sniffing.
The fourth of the district court habeas corpue proceedings,
Ortega v. Rasor• M.D., 291 F. Supp. 748(1968)' was, also, a discharge from custody in a facility which was basically a mental
institution.
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In the judgment, the petition for a writ ot habeas corpus
was denied; but, the petitioner was discharged from the custody ot
the Surgeon General tor return to the United States Marshal. 108

However• the judge did not invalidate an article ot the
federal Narcotic Rehabilitation Act which provided tor commitment
ot narcotic addicts to the custody of the Surgeon General tor
ment.

BolU.DllD was not extended. to an act which ordered

trea1~

compulso~

treatment since Ortega "had acted of his volition in requesting
civil comm:S.tment." 109
Showers v. Lloyd, 296 F. Supp. 441(1969) 1 was the most

recent dietriet court oaae in wldch a p•titioner,

11

who was in

state custody pursuant to his conviction upon his plea of guilty
to the charge ot possession ot heroin," 110 was denied his petition
for a WJ'it ot habeas corpus.
In his opinion, District Judge Hauk held that delay in sen•

teneing until atter the petitioner's discharge from the narcotics
rehabilitation center did not deprive him ot due process of law. 11
Referring to RAllialSHh the opinion denied. that sentencing after h12
discharge from th• rehabilitation center was double jeopardy.

Petitioner contends that his commitment tor- narcotic addic·
tion was a criminal sentence, and thus the subsequent sentence
by the Los Angeles County Superior Court consl.tuted a double
l08ortega v. Rasor, M.D., 291 F. Supp. 748(1968).
1091Rid1t 749.
llOSbowers v. Llody, 296 F. Supp. 441(1969).
111 IRM·

32
punishment for the same offense. The California Superior
Court has consistently held that no penal sanctions are involved in such a commitment tor narcotics addiction •••
Should commitment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code• 3051 be considered penal in nature it is clear that thE
doctrine ot Robinson v. California• 370 b.s. 660(1962) 1 would
require that the statute be declared unconstitutional. This
Court is satisfied that the statutes in question are not unc~,
stitutional on the ground that they permit double punishment. Besides the district court cases, BQ'Qiqggn was cited in
sixteen federal circuit toUl"ts ot appeals.

'l'hre• ot the eleven

circuits were represented in those cases.
Concerning the decisions in the oases, the majority ot

them upheld lower court Jl"Ulinget eleven upheld decieions or denied
petitions to vacate or correct aentenees.

Four of the cases were

~

reversed.

Three ot thoM ...re remanded tor new trials.

In two ot

the tour oases granting appeals and. reversing lower eourt decisions
the precedent ot h\d.;llD was cited to substantiate reaMna tor tht
deeiaions.

However• in the otheJ!i two decisions which were

revers~

Rsa1.UQD was not central to the final opinion of the Court.,
Nevertheless, in th• cases which denied petitions
lower court rulings, there were direct references to

or

uphelc

~DSQD•

Through those cases, the relationship of narcotic addiotion to ill·
ness was stressed and, then, dismissed in later cases.
weight of the
three cases.

Also, the

is2RiDIQ& decision was found in dissenting opinions in
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Consequently, there bas been no sustained extension of the
Supreme Court ruling in the later narcotic cases of the federal
circuit courts ot appeal.a.

The question of status has not been

raised again.

In 1963, the first federal circuit court ot appeals ease.
Nickens v.

u.s., 323

F. 2c:l 808(1963) 1 was heard in the second

District of Columbia Court ot Appeals.

The opinion included an

indirect nterence to IAbiQMD•

Concurring With the Court 1 Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright
obseJ'vedt

"This case involves a drug addict.

Narcotics addictio

poses a IJeJ'ioua problem tor eooi•t1t but the solutions at times
attempted raise other dangera•"f13_
The footnote reteNnoes given indicated the hearings at

the White House Contenu•• on ?farootic and Drug Abuse during whioh
the BQl4Ugg finding• ..,. Mntioned indirectly.,
It is now •ovel'Wbelld.nsl.7 aooepted.• th.At •addiction is the
manifestation of d.1..._ and. not in ita•lt a crime.• Statement ot Senator Jaoo'b Jt.. Ja.vits, Proceedings, Wh1te 1 ~uM
Conference on Nai-ootio and Drug Abu.- 1 P• 71\1962).

However, ad.ace the appellant "was convicted in the United
States District CoUl"t fol' the District of Columbia ••• ot possession• sale, and imPortation of narcotics," 11 5 and not tor addictio
the Supreme Court decision was not considered applicable.

The case of liightoW'el" v.
red to

iRla:~Ui5Ul

325 F. 2d 618(1963) 1 refer-

in a footnote which extended the reasoning about

11 '1rickens v.
114

u.s.,

u.s., 323
115

F. 2d 813(1963)

the correlation ot narcotic addiction and mental disease.
We do not, ot course, pass on the correctness ot these
views ••• As to proposals tor the •tnatment' of drug addicts
and methods, past and current, f'or their •punishment,• s••
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dou~las in-¥tbinson v.
California, 370 u.s. 660,668 e·t seq. (196Z). • ''
Although the information in the footnote did not influence
the decision in lij.ghtODJ't it did have an etf'ect on later cases in
which the treatment ot narcotic addicts and mentally ill persons
was oonsi.dered to be the same.

Also• BIR~ilStQ was mentioned in the dissent by Circuit
Judge hbJ',117

Th• third District of Columbia oase, Brown v.

.

u.,s.,

331 F•

2d 822(196't.) 1 decid•d the appeal of Alvin J. Brown who Challenged
his distnet court conviction tor narcotie eharges. 11 8 Heard

before Senior Cil'cuit Judge Edgerton and Cinuit Jud«•• Wright and
McGowan• the case emphasized ~·

The moving papers contained all•gations of long narcotic
addic.tion whieht ~Citing unqu•s. tioned by the Government or the
Court• must be uiten as true. • (N)arcotic addiction i" an ill..
ness ••• Ot course it is genera1ly conceded that a narcotic
addict, particularl~ one addicted to the use ot hel!'Oin~ is in
a state of mental and physical illness.• "!inaon v. California, 3?0 u.s. 660, 66? and note 8, (1962).
L1oyd v.

_u,.s. • 343 F. 2d 242( 1964) t the fourth District of

Columbia Circuit Cour't of Appeals case, was an aPJ*tl of a co:iviction for violation of the Harrison Act of 1914, which made crimina'

11 6Hightower v.

u.s., 325 F. 2d 618(1963).

117Ibia•• 616.

118Brown v.

u.s., 331 F. 2d 823( 1964) •
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a.ny unauthorized manufacture, possession; control, sale, prescrip-

tion or dispensation of narcotic drugs.
affirmed the decinon.

The Court of Appeals

Cii'euit Judge Fahy dissented.

Also dis-

senting were Chief Judge Bazelon and Cucuit Judges Washington and
Wright; they eaida
This petition should be granted tor two reasons; (1) The
trial judge's 1ntex-terenoe with jury consideration of the
inse.nit1 defense ••• (.?) The presence of substantial constitutional question.a which have been presented to this court with
increasing trequenoy. These questions 81'8 {a) whether punishment ot an addict sueh as be 1 who• puchatN and possession ot
narcotic drugs is explained entirely by his personal need for
repeated doaages ot tlu.s11 1• oru.·el and unusua1 1,,nishment,
Robinson v. Cal1torn1a, ,70
u.s. 660(1962) •••

The third 1964 Diatnot of Columbia case and the second
~

to be remanded, Jackson v.
on BAl?iDIAD

tor

u.s.,

336 F. 2d .579(1964), did not rely

the majerit1 opin:Lon.

Remanded With instructions.,

the case was a sucoesatul aPJ91Al et the defendant's conviction ot
"narcotic violatio111a. 0120
In Chief Judge aaz.lon•a dissent, which was a diaaent in
part only, the

iQ!!~D•I

pHted•nt waa attirmed with reference to

other governmental support ot the ruling.
Authoritative declarations from institutions in all three
branches ot Government recognize a relation between drug
addiction and mental illness ••• The Supreme Coutttl (I)t is
generally conceded that a narcotic addict, particularly one
addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state ot mental and
:Ph~sical ~tlness. Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660,
t;6, ••• 1
11 9Lloyd v. u.s., 343 F. 2d 245(1964).
120Jackson v. u.s., 336 F. 2d 5?9(1964).
121

I.Q:td1. 581.
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The fourth 1964 District

or

Columbia Cirevi t Cou_rt of

Appeals ease• the Adams v. U, s. , 337 F. ld 548 ( 1964,) 1 petition,
was to vacatf!J or correct lower court action on a Hc1rrison Act
violation for narcotics offenses.

Al though the petition was denied

Chiet Judge Ba.zelon again dissented in an opinion which used

Ro\1:&,n§On to foster the legal connection between narcotic addiction
and mental problems.
It appears that our indigent petitioner has a history of
drug addiction and claims to have been an ad.diet at the time
of the alleged nareotics offenses; that he was convicted of
Harrison Act violations by a f!!Y unaware that he wished to
raise an insanity defense •••
•••• here the point at issue is not the merits ot pet1t1oner•s
insa.n.1ty defense! bur2,heth«t" petitioner was denied a constitu·
tionally fair tr al.
.

Th• tirst 1965 case in the Circuit Court ot Apl)9als,
Hutcherson v.

u.s.,

3~5

F. 2d 964(1965), involved What beoame a

narcotics arrest after an initial detainment tor being

~aught

drinking an alcoholic bev.rage in the J>"Mnce of an otticer. 124

Replying to Hutchereon•s appeal, Senior Cireuit Judge of
the Court ot Appeals, Wilbur K. Miller, held that the ten-year
sentence tor the two offenses was not cruel and unusual punishment

and that Hutcherson was not able to choo• to be proMeuted under
District of Columbia law rather than tedel'al statutes. 125
t

l

.,,...,.,.

n

a

,.....,~

122Adams v., u.s.,
123!bUa, 549.
337 F. 2d 548(1964).
124-suteherson v. U,s., 345 F. 2d 965(1965).

1251.Qut... 964.
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However, Chiet Judge Bazelon dissented in part.

Referring

to the portion or the appeal entitled "Cruel and Unusual Punishment, •1126 the Chiet Judge notedt "Appellant argues for the first
time on appeal that Robinson v. California. 370

u.s.

660(1962)•
bars punishment tor possession and concealment ot narcotics.n 127
Reminding the Court ot the '*11tJ.1 holding, which was then
before the Court or1 appeal "No. 17894• 120

u.s.

App.

D.c._, 0128

Chiet Judge Bazelon suggested that flthe Rga~nman &r&"Ument ••• is

more properly to be made to the Supreme Cou.rt." 129
'l'h•n• calling tor additional study of the tta.ssertion ot
voluntar1neas" 130 in the decisions which rejected the ll~iDUQA
~

preeedentt the Chief Judge obeerved:
Indeed 1 the question or responsibility is the h._,.t of the
addict•s argument that he should not be punished tor posses~
Addicts have frequently been successful in this jur:18dietion 11
raising ·the inaani ty d•tense.. Other theories. to exouae reaponsibili tY t suoh as •ph~cologieal duress,' haw also been
advanced ••• I submit that Btl2i112D requires senoua oonsidera·
tion ot these claims as matters atteeting responaibility. But
I am constrained to ae;rff that n cannot constitr th•• claims
now since they were not advanced below and no eYidenee was
oftAPad. 1to ehow that here pessession was compelled by addicti.on~ r~

That "state court reluote.nce to extend l!Qbi:U§An seems to rest on a
conclusive presumption ot responsibil1tytn 132 was the reason
offered by Chief Judr;e Bazelon tor the need to examine

ot ree:ponaibility and cruel and unusual punishment.
126:[b.d, t 977.

130lb~4a.

127I.Qli1.

131..tP.JJ!t, 9r;.

a.

the questiox

u.s.

ex rel. Swanson v. Reineke, 3l+lt.

r.

38
2d 260(1966), was

the second circuit covt case in 1965 which upheld a district
court conviction tor both possesSion and aelt•adm1nistrat1on of
narcotics.

However, the vehicle, a federal habeas corpus proceed-

ing, through which the appeal was made was unuaual.
Nevertheless. Circuit Judges Waterman, 1.riendly and Hays

heard the caet on its merits.

In the opinion, CS..ouit Judge

Friendly heldl
Conneotieut statutes forbidding any pereon to manufacture.
posseu1 have under his control, sell, pnseribe• dispense,
compound 1 administer to himself or another or be addicted to
use ot nuootie drug and specifying measure of P'miahment for
crimes thus defined were not unconstitutional a.a applied to
dete~''who pleaded guilt7 to selt-adminiatration Of narcotics.
Summarizing the rejection ot B®il&IOB• Cireuit Judge
Friendly atatedt
We are unabl• to believe that a decision stat_. by the
Supreme Court to b9 lild.tecl to
particularized loeal law as
it has so tu been interpreted• by the looal oou:rte waa meant
to prevent all state l•gtslaturea and Congress .,._ detes-ld.ning, if th•f eee tita that the •lt-admin1atration ot narcotics or other noxious aubata.nces, and attendant purohaae or
:posaeeeion, involve such dangers to their umtrs* eueh potential
ot creating new addicts, and such other harmful social byproducts, that proof ol etJ"Ong emotion;t'4,or even et ph;r.s1olog1•
oal compulsion shall not be a defense.

•a

The third 1965 cireuit court case, Moralee v.
Zd 846(196.5) 1 was one ot two Ninth Circuit appeals.

133u.s. ex rel. Swanson v. Reineke,

'4nw..

1

263.

344 r.

u.s.,

344

In t'tte
2d 260(1966).

r.
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district court, Moral.ea had been prosecuted "for concealment and
facilitation of· concealment of heroin. tt 1.:~5 Tb.rough the appeal,
the opinion reached was that the detendant•a oonstitutional rights
had been violated.

However• the case did not deal with Bollil.QU except in a
footnote Which said that the case did not pertatn. 136

In the record of this ease however, there 1• tto cl•~ evidence
that appellant was addict;! to the compulsive tUM ot narcotics;
conaeque11f"• there is no adequate supperting P"lli• for his

argum:ent.

In 1965, the case ot Castle v.

u.s.,

347 F. 2d. 492(1965),

was appealed from the District of Colwnbia District Court.
Circuit Judge Wright treated th• ease in a manner whieh nversed
the trend toward combining narcotic addiction and mental illness.
He saidl

(T)estimoey relating to narcotic addiction pnv1d94 a basis
from Which the juryt under proper inst;ruotion~ eGttld have
tound a causal l:*'elationship b•tween defendant'• cbug-rttlated
ab•olfaal:l.ty and the cha.pged oft•nna of purohaa:ln.g dhga Without a tax staap and taoilitating the concealment and sale of
drugs knowing them to have bffn imported contrQ't te law, but
the jUX'y was not nquind to find. on the ertdeno that d•f,!eda.nt had mental disability wh1oh caused the a.eta Charged. ·
Sine• the appellant•s ela1m rested on that 1eaue of the
relationship of drug purchase and mental disabilit7, the lower

court connction was upheld.

The appeal had been baaed on the

growing tradition of linking narcotic addiction and mental illness.

135Moral.es v.
136zb'Q•1 tn.
1380ast1e

u.s.,

344 F. 2d 847(1965).
137Ib=L9s

z.
v. u.s., 347

F. 2d

492(1965).
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However, the need to stop that aasociation was advocated
by

Circuit Judge Burger, in a eoncurring opinion to that of

Circuit Judge Wrightt

'*Neither this couri nor any other court has

ever held that drug addiction is per se a toJ'm of mental disease
or •insanity• in the context ot assessing Ol"ind.nal responsibility.n 139
Instead of oontinuin5 to build a nt ot • • • in which
addiction was equated With disease, the

~stlg

appeal

atress~d

the

right ot federal regulation of interstate commerce with respect to
narcotics.

Circuit Judge Burger warned that continuing to combine

narcotic addiction and disease was "opening the dooi- to evading
~

the severe penalties Congress has fixed for tratticldng in

narcotics~" 1 40
The titth 1965 circuit court case and the teurth one in

the District ot Columbia to consider a narcotic otten&et Heard v.

u.s., 348

F. Zd 43(1965), affirmed a district court oonviction.

The Court ot Appeal.a held that evidence showing at mat that
detendant•s behavior controls might have been atl•ctecl i t
defendant were deprived ot heroin was insuttici•nt.to warrant
instruction en mental disea• or detect resulting mm ad.di~
t1onl in absence ot showi.ng th.at defendant was d~ived ot
hero n at the time Of the ottenset especiall7 'flMH then was
evidence that detendfflt had large quantities of heroin at the
time ot the offense.
Another rejection ot the ca•s whioh attempted to correlate

41

narcotic

~ddiction

and mental illness• the opinion commented upon

BQb;l.p;agn in negative terms.

Explaining that every addiot•s case

was not an insanity case• a footnote clEUtitied the :tollo'Wingt
Reference in the dissent to our ambiguous if not misleading statement in Brown v. United States• 118 u.s. A.pp. D.c. 76
( 1964), requires that the quotation from .BnD. and the reliance on Robinson v. California1 370 u.s. ~667 ••• be sc.ru""'
tinized in eon.text.
That portion of the .BmD quotation from ftW.UOf which
states that narcotics adarct!otiJs a mut&3. 1.~nens not the
language of the Supreme Court,

The tirst 1966 District ot Col1Jmbia Circuit Court of

AppQls case, Hansford v..

u.s.,

365

:r. 2d 920(1966),

Nversed a

decision ot the district court which bad. convicted appellant
Hansford ot a federal narcotic Violation.
the

earlier holdings that there

W'1us

The opinion merted. to

a connection bet.,..•n narcotic

addittion and mental illness.
However, Circuit Judge Danaher, who dissented hem the
opinion ot the Court, reminded the justice.a of pnnou.a d•o18ions
which had rejecte4 that relation.ship of nareotic a4Uct.ion and
mental illness.

"This court tu ·klwlE earlie:r rejected the con-

tention of one or two of our colleagues as to their construetion

or Robinson v. Calltornia•

310

rr.s. 660 1 £62(1962).• 1'*3

Also, in 1966, in the Northern Di.strict ot Illino1s 1

u.s.

v. Oliver, 363 F. 2d 1.5(1966) 1 affirmed. a lower court conviction
tor aale ot narcotics, resisting.prrest and a.sea.ult.

There was

1421bW•• tn. 3, 45.
143B.anstord v.

u.s. 1

365 F. 2d 927, tn. 2(1966).
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admission

or

narcotics use .?.nd addiction.

However, the crimes wit]

which Oliver was charged were not thought to have been contused
with his status.

"Addiction to narcotics is not itse 1 r a crime.

Robinson v. Cali torn1a, 370 U. s. 660 ( 1962) • tt H+4

The second Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Joseph v.
Klinger, 378 P'. 2d 308(1967), was an appeal "in forma pauperis tro11
an order ot the United States District Court for the Central District

or

Californ1a.u 145
In the opinion which atfirrned the lower court decision,

Judge Barnes ttheld that defendant's conviction and sentence ror
driving an automobile while under the influence of narcotics did
not constitute a cruel and

unus~al punishment.nl46

'!"he Court ot Appeals separated the state of addiction from
any action performed while under the influence of narcotics.
While appellant was tried after Robinson v. St. ot Calit.,
370 U.S. 660t1962), he cannot rely on its 'cruel and unusual
punishment; theory, because of the distinction made by the
California Supreme Court between the crime charged in f!j~nsqn
(status of addiction) and that charged here (the aot o 'iving) described in 23105 ot the California Vehicle Code. 1
Also, in 1967, the case of Bailey and Smith v.

u.s.,

386 Fi

2d 1(1967), held that RQatnsog was limited to the criminality or
addiction; and, concealing and transporting illegally imported
144u.s. v. Oliver, 363 F. 2d 18(1966).

l45Joseph v. Klinger, 378 F. 2d 308(1967).
146IbA4..,

l47Ibj.g., 311.
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not trom the original stamped
package Violated federal narcotics prohibitions. 148

narcotics and purchasing

nar~otics

Then, the first Second Circuit Court ease to comment on

cruel and unusual punishment with reference to narcotics,

u.s.

v.

Chow 1 398 F. 2d 596(1968), affirmed a conV1ct1on of the United
States District Court tor the Southern District ot New York.

Not

a major point in the opinion, the section which mentioned the
Eighth Amendment clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment
was raised in issue and dismissed.

It was not considered substan-

tial.

(A) five-year minimum sentence under the Narcotic Control Act
did not constitute a cruel a.nd unusual punishment prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment even wnen applied to a mother who had
no previous criminal record a1114 whose nine-year-old twins were
dependant on her tor support. 9
Although Rgb,n§.QQ was cited, the leneth ot the prison sentence was not cruel and unusual pun.ishment "in the light of Chow•s

significant participation in a large scale narcotics conspiraey." 1 ~

In Worthy v.

u.s.,

409 F. 2d 1105(1968), the Circuit Court

ot Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld the decision of the
district court which convicted the defendant of Violating narcoticf
laws.
l48Ba11ey and Smith v. u.s., 386 F. 2d 1(196?).
11t·9u. s. v. Chow• 398 F•. 2d 596, 7(1968).

150:tb:l.9tt 598.
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Heard before Sen:tor Circuit Judge Fahy and Circuit Judges
Burger and Wright, the case was decided by Senior
wrote the opinion, and Circuit Judge Burger.
dissented. 15 1

or

Fahy, who

Circuit Judge Wright

The opinion did not extend to BobLuiRll•
Wright's dissent, the concept

Jud~e

However, in Judge

status was introduced to show tha

the statute under which the arrest had been made was unconstitutional.
Appellant (Worthy) was convicted on two counts ot violatio
of narcotics laws. The narcotics themselves, which were intro
duced into evidence at trial, were discovered by the police
when they searched appellant after arresting him for vagrancy
under 22 D.c. Code 3302(1967) ••• the statute autb:ortzea arres
(and search) tor a status which 1 arguably• cannot constitution
ally be made the subject ot the 1,!iminal sanction. Robinson v
California, 370 u.s. 660(1962).

Through citations in the twenty-two federal f#aaes ot narcotics convictions, the
1962.

Bg~n19n

decision has been tested since

In the cases, the .Supreme Court ruling has not been consis-

Also, the elemen.ts ot commerce ngulatio

tently applied, however,

ot narcotics traffic and of punishment tor criminal behavior while
under the influence ot narcotics have not been found to be within
the scop• ot the decision.
Similarly, the legal status of alcoholimn has been reviewe

by

cases which have used

BQpinaan

citations•

Six cases have in-

cluded reasoning, at least in part, from Bopin§Rn to deci9e issues
151worthy v.

u.s.,

152 ~U~ii9" 1111 •

409

r.

2d 1105(1968).

about peroo"1s convicted

or

vio:tati:n.s lawe which p1.1nish.ed alcohol-

ism.
In Bates v. Rivers, 323 F •.'2d 311(1963), the appeal in-

volved a conviction tor intoxication while on parole after having
served time in prison ror another charge.

Although Circuit Judge

Eurger held tha.t Bates was not entitled to apply his time spent on

parole age.inst the remaining sentence following revocation ot

~

ole tor intoxication, Circuit Judge Wright disagreed.
BgQ~QBQD

ever.

was introduoed and dismissed in the dissent, how-

The argument was based on the difference between the maxi-

mum sentence a.u·thorized (72 months) and the actual time in custody
~

(?5 months).
Then, in 1966t the case of Driver v. Hinnant, 3;6 F. 2d 761
(1966), approximated both the tactual situation and the decision ir.
The Court ot Appeals ••• held that a North Carolina statute
providing that auy person found drunk or intoxicated. on a public highway or at any public place or meeting ab.all be guiltJ;~.
of a misdemea.nor could not be applj.ed to a chronic alcoholic ••_.. . .

Circuit Judge Albert v. Bryan explained that the "unwilled
and ungovernable111 55 quality ot chronic alcohol1$Dl caused the

status to be within the ruling ot ig:Q;LnsQQ•
Compounding preoedent tor the defense ot chx'onic alcoholism
1 11
; Driver

v. Hinnant, 356 F. 2d 762( 1966) •

155 4122.sl.,, 763.
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in contrast to pub11,c intoxioat.ion, the C9.se of Enster v. District
of Columbia• 361 F. 2.d 50(1966), in which Circu:i.t Ju<lce Fahy,
Ch:tet t.iudge nazelo11 nud Circuit Judea HcGowe.n joined,. r,_saerted:

There can be no judgment ot criminal con.Viction passed upon

him. To do so would affront the Eighth Amendment, af' eruel anc
unusual punish.r11ent in brandin~; gim a er1minal, 1ri•espective or

consequent detention or tine. 5

Also, in 1966, the Supreme Court ease ot Budd v. California, 385

dissent.

u.s.

911 ( 1<)66), included B2'RiDl\1D in Hr. Justice Fortas•

Although the Court denied certiorari in the ease, Mr.

Justice Fortas stressed the need tor 1.nstrl:\etion on state laws
eoverning alcoholism.

Bt&lltmra makes
it clear that a State may not constitutionally inf~ punishment tor an illness, l~ther the illness be narcoticua addiotior
Mr. Justice Stewart's op1ni0t1 for the Court in

or the •common cold.•

One year later, Powell v. Texas, 392

u.s.

514(196?), did

raise the issue of the constitutionality of a statute Which punished publ1.c intoXication.

The opinion ot Mr. Justice Black with

which Hr. Justice Harlan co11curred, emphasized that Powell v.

Texas, 392

u.s.

514(1967), was not within the scope

et

igbiustn• i!X

However, Mr. Justice White, who concurred in the result,
disagreed with Justices Black and Harlan concerning the appropriate•

ness of Bal!'8n:IPD•

56Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F. 2d 50(1966).

1

l57Budd v. California~ 385 U.S. 911(1966).

158Powe11 v. Texas 392
1

u.s.

537(196?).
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Unless BQb4DiAD is to be abandoned, the use ot narcotics by an
addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law. Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irrestible urge to consume
alcohol 5ahould not be punishable tor drinking or tor being
drunk. ':I
Repeating his earlier views in .l.Y.U. Mr. Justice Fortas,
who dissented from the opinion of the Court, supported the prece-

dent of BalaiaSGD•
!¥biDIQD stands upon a principle which, despite its
sublEty, must be simply stated and respectfully applied because it is the foundation ot individual 11.bert.7 and the cornerstone ot the relations between a civilized state and its
citizenst Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a
person tor being in a condition he is powerless to change. 160
In its decision, the Court distinguished between chronic
alcoholism and public intoxicatton.

The former was cons14•red to

be unpunishable because involuntary.

The latter was sa.14 to be

criminal behaVior. or within the criminal laws.

Since Powell was

charged with the latter, he was convicted justly, according to the
Supreme Court at that time.

Then, in 1968t Doughty v. Beto, 396 F. 2d. 128(1968), which
did involve a conviction tor alcoholism, was not governed by the
Rn~~na~n

precedentJ because, the conviction rested. on behavior, not

the status itselt. 161
From the six cases between 1962 and 1970, the status ot
alcoholism has followed that ot narcotics addiction With respect tc

16019~.' 56'7.
t6tDoughty v. Beto, 396 F, 2d 130(1968).

159.llWl.t..1 548, 9.
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the oriminal law.

The involuntary condition has been removed trom

criminal sanction, but any criminal behavior has not been excused.

Alsoa vagrancy, the ripe issue stated in the Memorandum
Opinion ot the State of California Superior Court which prompted

the structuring ot the

appeal to the Sup.rem• Court in

RQi~DIAD

terms of a statue question, has been shown to be within the scope

ot the Supreme Court ruling.

Clearly held to be exempt ot crimi-

nal sanction, tlie status of vagrancy was absolved in two federal

court cases betwen 1962 and '962 and 1970.
First brought to the Supreme Court in Hioka v. District of
Columbia• 383

u.s.

257(1965) 1 the issue of vagrancy was not de~

cidedS because; the case was denied certiorari.
However, Mi-. Justice Douglas commented on the issue in a
dissenting opinion which said that certiorari should have been
granted..

Quoting his own concurring opinion in BQ.:Q;la•D• Mr.

Justice Douglas saidt
can be

made a crime any

n1 do not see how •conomio
moH

Robinson v. California• 370

o• social status

than being a drug addict aan be.

u.s.

660 1 668(coneurring opinion)."

162

Later• a three-judge district court tor the District of

Colorado declared a vagrancy statute void in Goll•an v. Kneoht,
295

r.

Supp. 897(1969).

The judges elaborated on

lated to the status of narcotic addiction in

va~ancy

BG~iDlll•

- 1 ~cks v. District ot Columbia, 383

u.s.

corre-

Citing

2,52(1965).
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fgw1llt

Ro'Q~QsoD,

and ldmu:Qcb Judge William E. Doyle reasoned.1

It addiction to narcotics is a status which the legislature
cannot validly declare to be a crime under Rab~UIADt it tollowe
that the Colorado attempt to declare idleness or indigenc1
eoupled with being ablebodied must aleo (indeed even more) be
held beyond the power ot the state legislative body. The
statute, in part at 1.ast 1 does not r9<1.utr. either act or
·
behaVior. It deals with condition. Therefore, insofar as the
statutory pl'escription seeks to legislate against status, it
is in conflict with the s¥gatantive due process limitations of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ~
Another category which has reflected the culture of the
period ha.a been that ot hippie.

Not the same as vagrant, the

status, nevertheless, has been subjected to similar laws and judgments.

Two cases between 1962 and 1970 have made BQaiarum rele-

vant to oases about punishing hippiea,
In an action under the Civil Rights Act, Hughes v. Rizzo,
282 1. Supp. 881(1968), the district court heldt

••• our criminal laws are directed toward actione not status.
Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660(1962) 1 · It 1• not a crime
to be a 'hippie' and the police could not iawtullJ' ~at on
the basis ot suspicion, or even probable cause to 'believe, tha1
the urestee oecy~4ea the status of being a homoauual or
narcotic addict. ·
After that inclusive, it illogical, pronouncement on the
range of freedom

or

status provided by

R,Qb~nsgp.,

there was a 1969

case which reached the same conclusion. Broughton v. Brewer, 298
F. Supp. 260(1969) 1 declared an Alabama vagrancy statute, which
had been invoked against hippie loitering, was ao vague that it

163Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897(1969).
164.nughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 884(1968).

violated due process ot law.

However, a request tor an injunction

against future arrest under the same statute was denied.

RQ.RiUIRJl

was not e::::tended to the granting of that injunction where prosecution had not taken plaoe, but was "merely threatened.n 165

Then, a fifth category of status, mental illness, has been
cited frequentl.7 1.n the tradition of Bal>t.MPn•· N•ar1Y synonymous
with narcotic addiction in many cases subsequ•nt to the Supreme
Court decision, mental. illneea
punished by criminal ata.tut•••

was

not a status which bad been

However• th• ca.sea have sought to

prove that indirect]J the tonclition was the contNlling tor-ee in
behavior which was )>Uld.8he4.

In Sas v. State ot Maz7la.nd 1 334 F. Zd 5()6(1964) 1 Circuit
Judge J. Spencer Bell Mviewed the h1ato27 of the law and etatus

cases.
Care, however, ahoul4 'M taken to read these caMa in the light
of the Courtts more no•nt deo18ions beginning With Gitlow v.
New York, 268 11.s. 6,'2(192,) 1 in which the Court has broadened
the coneept ot liberty con't81ned in the toupteenth amendment
and thus has bl"Ought te ~ on th• states the constitutional
requirement ot fundamental fairness contained in many sections
ot thf 6~111 ot Righta net theretofore thought to apply to
them.

In

u.s.

ex rel. Kessler v. Fay• 232 F. Supp. 139(1964) 1 a

petition for a writ ot habeas corpus based on mental illness was
denied; but, the possible relationship of RqqinlQD was established.
The justification of the petition was acknowledged.
16

~roughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 270(1969).
l66.sas v. State or Maryland, 334 F. 2d 516(1964).

51
To be sure, the fact that he was one• a mental incompetent and
an incessant user ot narcotics thereafter does not, in and of
itself, establish that he was insane at vital periods, but is
certainly probative on the basic issue and is sufficient to
repel any suggestion that his claim was made ot whole cloth. 167
Then, 1n Sweeney v.
dent

or

u.s••

353 F. 2d 10(1965) 1 the prece-

RQb4DiRD was used to combine alcoholism and involuntary

b•haV1or to constitute a status which should not have been punished.168
More consistently related to i9l21.nssu1 1 the case ot Rouse v.
Gameron• 373 F. 2d. 451(1966}, argued that n1ndetin1te oontinement
without treatment ot one who has beentound not criminally respon•
sible may be so inhuma.ne as to be 'cruel and unusual puueh•

ment.•n169

.

Tb.en, in Collins v. Cameron 1 377 F. 2d. 945(1967)• an appeal

ot a district court ruling ordering hospital eornmitment, Circuit
Judge Burger stated:

"Nothing in Robinson, or Easter, 1mpin5es in

any way on our holdings ••• being found not guilty 'by

~son

ot

insanity on a oha.rge of second-degFee murder. 01 7°
Correspondingly, there was a rejection

or

RQld,>umn as a

basis tor alleging that a mental patient•s.extended. jail sentence

167u.s. ex rel. Kessler v. Fay, 232 r. Supp,. 11+1(1964).
168sweeney v. u.s., 353 r. 2d 11(1965).
l69Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F. 2d 4530966).
l?OOollins v. Cameron, 3?7 F. 2d 947(1967).
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was cruel and

um1i:.mal

punishment in Roberts v.

rr.s. •

391 F. 2d 991

(1968). 171
Similar to Rouse v. Cameron, 37.3 F. 2d 451(1966), the ease
of

u.s.

ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1071(1969), dis-

cussed the right to treatment while confined.

Lack of

~edical

attention was said to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment;

RQR*D§.OD waa cited as p~•c•d•nt. 1 72
Finally, the last category of status which has boen said
to

be

within the scope of RQRi1m1 has been that of so-called sex

offender. One case betwffn 1962 and 1970 has been tried in the

.

district court ot the Western D1rt•1on of Pennsylvania and appealec
to the Third Circuit+

tJ • s. ex Ml• Gercbman v. 1-ia.roney 1 235 F.

Supp. 588(1964) 1 the distnot court ca., upheld the Barr-Walker
Act because it

had.

not "authorized or imposed punishment for the

condi tio:i1 of a person W1 thin Pennsylvania." l 73 The opinion continued to say that it tb4t Act had punished status, then it would

have been in violation ot the Fourteenth Amendment as provid&d in
Rqb;j.JlSQ.Gt 174

When the appeal Of U,S. ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, .355 F.
2d 302(1966)• was affirmed with an opportunity for the district
court to retey the case within 60 days, the rertson for the decision
1'?1 Rober.ta v.

u,s ••

391 F.

2~

992(1968).

172u.s. ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1088(1969).

l73u.s. ex rel. Gerehman v. Maroney 1 235 F. Supp. 594(1964)~
174n1d.
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was lower court denial of procedural due process.

Reterenoe to

BgbiDaqn was a footnote which indicated the eonst:ltT:tional basis
of conside:t:'ing the Pennsylvania atatute. 175

The second trend indicated

by

decisions citing

B2ntnsQn

has been the exten$10n ot the doctrine or incorporation.

Throueh

the expansion ot the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment to the states through the due process

clause or the Fourteenth Amendment• BQ:Qinegn has been an example oJ
the progress toward applying the first ten Amendttents to the United
.
States

Qg;gtUuiiln
BIJliDi.ttl

has

to the states.
been cited in cases which have sought to d.,

velop the three phrases of the Eighth

~:ndment.

Bes1.des the pro-

hibition against cruel and unusual punishment• the prohibitions
against excessive bail and excessive fines have bffn eited.

'l'he

death penalty hae been said to be cruel and unusual punishment in
this time.

Also, unfair procedures in prisons and racially-moti-

vated. punishment ot conVieted persons have been said to be within
the prohibition given in

llDiD'ln•

Mentioned in five landmark Supreme Court eases and in three
lower court cases in the federal courts between 1962 and 1970,
Rn'h-t ""c""'"' has been reeognized to be on• ot the chain ot opinions

175u.s. ex rel, Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 308(1966).
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which brought the first eight ot the l\.m.endments t;o the $tates
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth At1f.mdrr.ent.

Bet;irurl.ng with Gideon v, Wainwright• 373

n.s. 342(1962),

Which provided tor the eongtitlrtional right to counsel 1::1 state
criminal trie.ls. RQh;i.;ilQ.Il was ei ted in suppo.r-t or the crow1.nt;;

understandine ot the states• rights in terms of the tir.st ten
Amendments.

In his opin1.on for the Conrt, Hr. Justice Black developed
the theme.

he said:

Progressins t1u"'ou.gh the Fourth and Fitth L"tlendme11ts,

"though not always in precisely the same terminology,

the Court has made obligatol'y on the Sta.tea ••• the Eighth's ban
on cruel and unusual pl.tnishment.tt 17 6 At that point, then was a
footnote citing BQb:tnen1•

Then* in Malloy v, Hogan, 378

u.s.

6(1963), when

Mr.

J".lstice Brennan delivered the opinion of' the Court, he included an
extensive footnote concerning the Eighth Amendment.
citation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 373

u. s.

Following a

342(1962), he recom-

mended:
See also Robinson v. Calitorn1a 1 370

u.s.

660(1962) 1 which

despite lt1 re Kamler, 136 u.s. 436; HcElvain• v. Brush_, 142
U.S. 155; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, matle applicable to
the Sta.tea
Eighth Amend.ment;a ban on oruel a.nd unusual
7

t;,

punishments.
· - - - -.............

"'1

.. .......

t76Gideon v. W~nwr1ght, 372
t77~ialloy v. Hogan, 378

u.s. 342(1962).
u.s. 6, rn. 6(1964).

Next, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
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488(1964), Mr.

u.s.

Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice

Brennan, wrote a separate concurring opinion which noted

BqJa~asm

as precedent fol" the application ot the Eighth Amendment.
'l'his Court, in a series ot decisions,. bas h•ld that the
Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those
epecitios of the first t1§ht amendments Which express tunda...
mental personal rights.
Again, Mt>. Justice Goldberg concurred. in a aepaJ-ate opinion
in

Pointer v. Texas, 380

u.s. 412(1964),

which cited it1N.DIRD to

explain that "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition ot Ol'Uel and
unusual punishm.ents" 179 was one ot "the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees against 1ntr1ngement"by the States.n 180

u.s.

Recently, the Supreme Court case, Duncan v. Louiaiana• 391
145(1968), contained a tootnote Which relegated the etgniti-

cance of BotaJ119n to striVing tor incorporation.
the novelty of the cases which accomplished the

Commenting upon
inCO.l'JO~ationt

the

reference observed that "recent eases applying provisions of the
first eight Amendments to the States represent a new approach to
the 'incorporation• debate,." 18 1

Following were th!'ee lower federal court oases which stated
that

iQy~m;w.

had brought the cruel e.nd unusual punishment clause

l78Griewold v. Connect1out, 381
l79Pointer v. Texas, .:580

u.s.

u.s.

488(1964).

411(1964).

180lb2.41
l8 1Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

u.s.

149(1968).

ot the Eighth Amendment to the states thl"ough the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Two of these were Hobson v.

Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401(1967), a school integration suit, and
Green v. Board ot Bl•ctions of the City ot New York, '80

:r.

24 445

(196?).

Also, in the ease ot

v.s.

ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 410 :r.

24 1088(1969)• the emphasis oontinued to be plaeed on the extensior:

ot the Bill of Rights to the states.

Al though a status issue was

involved in the petition tor a wit of habeas corpus filed on behalf of an inmate ot thit Dann•mora State Hospital, Dannemora. New
York1 the eitation ot ltld.llPD 1!4• a footnote abOut its .role in
ineoll"p0rat1ng the Eighth Amendment. 182
In. addition to th• atension

ot the Eighth Amendment, the

development of the acepe of its pl'Ovild..ons has been eneouraged
through oases which have :Nlied on Bala2'A8Ul•

'i'h• pPOhibition

against denial ot bail hae b-.n .read into the prohibition against
excessive bail.
has not

However• the application ot the

reversed~

u.s.

B@l?lDma ruling

opiniona,of that kind.

ex rel. Prirttera .,., ltroea, 239 F. Supp. 118(1965),

contai.ned a ruling by District Jud.g• Weinfeld of the Southern Dist...
rict of New York, which held that it was not cruel an.4 unusual to
182u.s. ex rel. Bruno v, Herold, 410 F. 2d 1088(1969).
183u.s. ex rel. Privite~ v. Kross, 2'9 :r. Supp. 118(1965).
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impose excessive bail With imprisonment as an alternative if the
accused were unable to raise the amount.t83
Kelly v. Seboontield, 285 F. Supp. 732(1968), was an action
city jail prisoners who alleged that '•confinement tor nonpayment
of tines and costs was unconatitutional." 184 However, the Maryland
by

District Court held that the statutes which }.Jl'Ovided tor the eonfinement were constitutional. 18 5 Furthermore, tn an unusual commentary on the meaning of iQJainMXh the Court ob...,... that the
prisoners had committed. crtmes1 and• they were not dia.ased. 186

11.s. ex rel. Siegel v. Follett•• 290 F. Supp. 632(1968},
was a group of "petitions tw habeas corpus seeking release trom
~tate prison pending appeal ot ~onvictions." 18 7 The pttitiona
were den1-1 on the grounds that the "burden ot presenting tacts to
support a finding of arbitrary denial ot ba11n 188 waa net met.

The

opinion did state that the right to bail should be reapected to the
extent that the Eighth Amend-.nt had been made relevant to the
states by BGiiRIOB•189
Besides cases whioh

ext•nd~

the prohibitions against levy-.

ing exceuive bail and excessive tines, there have b•n oases whieh

18-'u.s. ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239

r,

Supp. 118(1965).

l84xelly v. Scboontield 1 28; F. Supp. 7'2(1968).
185

xai4 •• 133.

l87u.s. ex rel.
188
1;i&,, 635·

186

Il.}is •• 135.

Siegal v. Follette, 290
189 IhiA1

r.

Supp. 632(1968).
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presented particular instances of punishment that were said to be
cruel and unusual.

Irregularities in court procedures and in

sentencing were protested.
The case of U.S. ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 305 F. 2d

715(1962) 1 held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments was applicable to the states.t90
Nevertheless, the Court ot Appeals affirmed a district court denial

ot a writ of habeas corpus; because, the defendant had not applied
to the Supreme Court tor certiorari to review the state court
decisions., 191
More speeitically denyi~g claims ot "cruel and inhumane
treatment 01 92 were u.s. v. Vita, 209 F,, Supp. 172(1962), and u.s.

ex rel. Bryant v. Fay, 211 r. Supp. 812(1962).
Then, two 1963 eases applied

RQs~nson

unfair punishments had not been invoked.

to determine that

U.S. v. Hendrick, 218 F.

Supp. 293(1963), stated that the punishment had not been disproportionate to the offense.

Hyser v. Reed, 31 B F. 2d 22lf( 1963) • held

that parole had not been revoked unjustly.
Both

G~d•2n

and

Boblnsgn

were applied to Perkins v. State

ot North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333(1964);

Perkins was ordered

"released within 60 days unless the State should elect to try him
again." 193

l90u.s. ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 305 F.
19 1Xbi4i

1 2

9

u.s.

2d 715(196.2)

v. Vita, 209 F. Supp. 174(1962}.

l93Perk1ns v. St. of North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333(1964).

59
A second 1964 habeas corpus proceeding, Goss v. Bomar, 337

F. 2d 341(1964), was not successful.
hausted his state remedies.

The petitioner had not ex-

Nevertheless, the appropriateness ot

raising the issue of whether a "life sentence without possibility
of parole under the Tennessee Habitual

Statute violated
the Eighth Amendment to the tederal Const1tutionn 194 wns shown to

be free of doubt left by

Crimin~l

v. West Virginia,

Gr~.ham

2.2L1- U.S. 616

(1912) 1 as a result ot the action taken 1.n.Rob1nSQJl· 195
Also accepting the Supreme Court decision as precedent, the

ease of

u.s.

ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844(1965),

granted an appeal tor a habeas corpus proceeding under c1v11
~

remedy proceedings.

Sturm v. California Adult Authority, 395 F. 2d

However, in

446(1967), the court affirmed a lower court ruling against granting a writ ot habeas corpus.

The California Adult Authority was

said to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the length ot time
to be served when indeterminate sentences had been ordered.
A particular torm ot punishment has been said to be prohibited by ,Ro..blnsgn.

That iG the death penalty.

primary issue in four cases between 1962 and 1970
Eighth Amendment.

by

cited the

the prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment.

l94aosa v. Bomar, 337 r
1

whic~

Although the death penalty waa not removed from

use, it has been threatened

195Xbif.d,,

It was the

342.

2d 341(1964).
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Whether the Eighth Amendment applied to the death penalty

was asked in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375

u.s.

889(1963).

The Court

denied certiorari; although, Mr. Justice Goldberg, who was joined
by

Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented Vigorously.
Citing Weems v.

u.s.,

217 U.S. Jtt,9(1909), and referring to

"does the imposition ot the death
penalty tor rape constitute •unnecessary cruelty•tn 196 The

Bczbinggu, the justices asked1
question followed anotherl

Can the permissible aims of punishment(e.g., deterrence,
isolation, rehabilitation) be aehieved as effectively by
puniehing
18Sf9"8Verely than by death(8•8•t by life
impriaenment •••

rar

R~eating

the same question, Jackson v. Diokaont '25 F. 2d

575( 1963) 1 decided Decuh1ber 30, two months after

11&4al'ai1

also

affirmed the imposition of the death penalty tor a person tound
responsible not only to:r rape, but also tor mu:rder. 198 However,
in the opinion, Judge

Duni~

speculated "that i t anything in the

CnnAt1.tutinn forbids the penalty, it muat be the lighth Amend-

ment.tt 199 The r•aaoning was direoted away from the death penalty
to the question of status.
Does the imposition ot the death penalty und•r these circumstances constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth .Amendmentst Jackson asserts
that it does. His primary reliance is on Robinaon v. California, 370 u.s. 660 ••• The State ot California did not sen196Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
197'12:2.Jli

u.s.

889, tn. 7(1963).
l98Jackson v. Dickson, 325 F. 2d 573(1963).

1991W1u ;75.
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tence Jackson to death a5cause he was mentally 111.
tenced hi.m tor murder. 2

It sen-

Again, in Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760(1968), the
death penalty was not held to be cruel and unusual punishment.
However, the applicability of

RQb~ll§.OD

to the issue was credited.

Finally, the mo.st recent example of a ease which r'ai.sed

the issue of the death penalty was settled in the manner in which
the earlier ones were decided.

In Sims v. Eyman, 405 F. 2d 439

(1969), the opinion was that under current law, the death penalty
was not oruel and unusual punishment. 201
Similar to the cases which challenged unfair sentences,
there have been others which have been lodged

by

inmates seeking

to remedy prison conditions and treatment employed.

In most of

the cases of this nature between 1962 and 1970, the convicted have
rejected particular regulations and codes practiced by prison officials.
Two cas&s decided in the United States District Court tor
the Northern District ot Illinois, Eastern Division, by Judge Will
immediately as$erted the Rgb4nsgn findings.

In Redding v. Pate,

220 F. Supp. 124(1963), the opinion commented upon alleged
t•1ntentional deprivation ot essential medical care. u 202
The alleged facts probably constitute cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning ot the Eighth Amendment. In
light of this, it is perhaps fair to assume that Judge Lindley
did not rely on the Eighth Amendment because as the law stood

2001b14,

201 s1ms v. Eyman, 405 F. 2d 447(1969).

202Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124(1963).

then(1948), the Supreme Court had never, !a so many words,
sanctioned its application to the States. 3
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Generously viewing the parameters of RQRin§S}n, Judge Will
said that "the cases ma.k.e it clear that the concept of 'cruel and
unusual punishment' is broad and ela.stic. 0204

Again, quoting V.ir. Justice Douglas, in

u.s.

ex rel.

Hancoc~

v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202(1963), Judge Will asked whether "the use

ot the sanction against a prisoner who acted in self-defense, to
borrow language from Mr,. Justice Douglas. was a punishment out ot
all proportion to the offense so as to bring it within the ban
against cruel and unusual punishment?n205
However, the Tenth Circuit decision of Kostal v. Tinsley,
337 F. 2d 845(1964), did not so broadly interpret Rcb;t,nson. Placine
a prisoner in solitary confinement attar he had attempted to escapE
was not oonsidered to be cruel and unusual punishment. 206
A year later, an Arkansas District Court trom the Eastern
District• Pine Bluff Division, in Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp.
687(1965) did grant an "injunction restraining authorities0207
1

from the use of 0 corporal punishment"~g~
and unusual punishment.n 209

0

an infliction of cruel

20 5u.s. ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 205(1963).
206Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F. 2d 845(1964).
207Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683(1965).

208'.J:b:J.<l•,

209:tli;W .. , 687.
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In I-iandman v. Peyton• 370 F. 2.d 135(1966) • the United
States Court ot Appeals tor the Fourth 01l."cuit affirmed a decision
by tht Eastern District of Virginia at Richmond.

Supporting the

"uae of tear gas approximately 12 to 15 times in the course ot a
year in a Virginia p.rison," 210

Judges Haynsworth, Sobelof'f and

Bryan ruled that these were legitimate exerci•s ot disciplinary
authority.

'l'he placement ot prisoner Landman "ih solitary confine-

ment tor violation of a regulation prohibiting imaates against
using, tor scrap, legal papers supplied by the pen1tentiaryn211 was
permissible, too.
\fnght v. McMann 1 257 F. Supp. ?39(1966)4 387 F. 24 519
~

(1967), anothei- prisoner's motion protesting sol1\a.J7 oentinement,
was dismissed f'irst on detendant•s motion. 212 Then, the Civil
Rights aotton was reversed and J>emanded in a lateli" 1967 appeai. 21 3
The &IWJlan principle was reinforced by an. earlier d.tation &om

'l'rop v,, Dulles, 356

u.s.

86(1958)1

'*Th• Eighth Amendaht torbids

tr.atment so foul• ao inhuman and so violative of balri.o concepts
ot decency."21 4
.Al.GO dil'ect-4 against the practice ot solita.17 confinement

210tandman v. Peyton, 370 F. 2d 135(1966).
211 tta.si •.
21

2wr1ght v. McMa.nn 1 257 i\ Supp. 739( 1966) •

21 -"wright v•.

McMann,

214i1Wlt.. 526.

387 F. 2d 520( 1967)•

ot prisoners, Jordan v. F1tzha.rris1 2.57 F. Supp. 674(1966), pro-

duced an "injunction permanently restraining prison authorities. "2. l 5
Emerging from the Ea.stern District ot Arkansas where
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 845(1964) 1 had S9cured an injunction

~gainst

corporal punishment, Jackson v. Bishop• 268 F. Supp.

804(1967), was an.other case requesti.ng that prison otf'ioials be
ordered to desist trom physically abusing prison•rs.

Bob'Q'oll

Although

was cited, Judges Oren Harris and Gordon B., Young doubted.

that the use ot the strap would be cruel and unusual punishment.

.

In order to 1-emove the possibility ot a misuse et the punishment,
the judges devised an elaborate p:rocedure requiring adnd rd strative
reYiew. 216

Then, in 1968 1 the tendency to acknowledge th• 1:1.ghth
Amendment, but to deny that any action involving a petitioner had
b..n cruel and unusual punishment, continued in Konigsberg v.
Ciccone, Z85 F. Supp. 5(1968).
Treatment of prisoner in a medical center, inoludtng alleged
beating when he resisted search ot his person, his confinement to strip cell, and inspection of his p$rsttn tor contratand by nonmedical administrazf'e persons. did not constitute
eruel and inhuman punishment.

21 5Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674(1966).
21 6Jaokson v. Bishop,. 268 F. Supp. 805(1967).
21 7Kon1gsberg v. Ciccone, 285

r.

Supp. 5(1968).

6;
However, the prisoner was granted the right to attend
Jewish religious services. 21 8

The second 1968 case against prison ottieials, Burns v.
Swenson, 288 F. Supp. 4(1968), was a hearing of a number of com.plaints by prisoners in a m.'lXimum security unit.
concerning abridgment of constitutional rights

The grievances

1Nl'f!

ordered to be

resubmitted through revised standards of the Mlasouri department
ot eorreotions. 21 9
Oecurring a third tL"ne in 1969, the case ot Bolt v .. Sarver1
330 F. Sl.1.pp. 825( 1969), was an action by state :Pl'i••r• in the

Eastern District of Arkansas11ho claimed that alitarJ eon.tine-

.

ment and substandard cells nre ib violation of oonatituttonal
rights.

An orda granting declaratory judgment and 1njunc.t1ve

relief was based on

iabjngqa+ The punishment was

~

against

"concepts of decency and human dignity and precepte •t •1v1lt.zat1ons wld.oh Aaericans profess to posaess,n220

Also protesting the use of solitary contintlaent, Hanooek
v. Avery 1 301

r.

Supp. ?86(1969),

established that it was cruel

an:

unusual to ignore •'the fundamental concepts of 4••••• " 221
Quoting BsiPiDson in the text, the case reattirmed the applicabili t:
of the Eighth Amendment prohibitton at,!:ainst cruel and unusual

punishment to anlitary confinement.
21 8tB:LS

1

21 9Burns v. Swflmaon 288 F,. Supp. 5(1968).
1

22.0Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 826(1969).
221 Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786(1969).
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In

ti.

special area of complatnts from prison inmates were

those alleging racially-motivated punishment.

Two cases protested

actions 1n Alabama prisons.

Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327(1966), granted
"declaratory and injunctive relief concerning racial segregation
in the state pGnal system and in county, city and town ja.ils.n222

Beard v. Lee, 396 F. 2d ?49(1968), upheld an allegation of
cruel and unusual punishment on racial grounds. 223 The case considered

BaQi;aa 1n its finding.
Tb.roughout the ea.see which extended the scope ot &iQinfiSm,

there have been issues concerned with the provisions of the Eighth
~

The ramifications ot these eases have bdn decisions

Amendment.

about the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment and about the
Possible implications ot those prohibitions.

Although inconsis-

tent, the opinions ot the federal courts have stretched tl1• cruel

and unusual punishments clause to include exeassiv• bail and tines,

.

untail" sentenc:1.ng procedures 1 and harsh prison conditions.

There

has bee:r1 indication that even the death peualty may o•• to be
eonside~

within the prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment sill

222waab1ngton v. Lee, 263 r. Supp. 327(1966).
223
Beard v. Lee, 396 F. 2d 749(1968).

IV
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT FEDERAL COURT PERCEPTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF R0Bi:tl€QI
In contrast to its broad scope and diverse ramifications,
Bo~~n§S'?n

has been interpreted narrowly in the federal courts be-

tween 1962 and 1970.

Rather than seeking ways to bring the de-

cision to comparable questions before them, justices in both federal 'district and circuit courts ot appeals have shown

reluctance

even to accept the principle that a state law which punishes
status is unconstitutional.

An explanation for the response

by

the federal court

system to Robinson has resulted trom observation ot the 349 tederaJ
and state court cases whieh have cited the Supreme Court decision.
The opinions have reflected especially elose reading ot the entire
majority opinion ot the Supreme Court and ot the concurring
opini~n

of Mr. Justice Douglas.
In the opinion of the Court, the new application of the

Eighth .Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
was balanced by reassurance that state's rights were not infringed.
The right to penalize unwanted behavior was established before the
protection of status was imposed.

These provisions tor exceptions

to the decision were central to the reasoning.

Later courts
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utilized the alternatives to the holding to evade the fundamental
principle of RQ9iD§S2ll•
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Douglas• concurring opinion was
frequently quoted.

Seized enthusiastically by sponsors of re-

habilitation who condemned prison terms for persons convicted of
crimes of status, the text also was lamented by advocates of severe
penalties for criminals.

While the opinion apparently was written

to insure the humane attitude of courts toward man in whatever
condition he was, the dramatic presentation was thought by law
enforcement advocates to be "brimful of what Learned Hand once
called the •watery sentiment that obstructs, delays and defeats
the prosecution of crime.•«224
~

Consequently, the roots of the later decisions which
perceived and interpreted Robiusgn have been drawn trom the
Supreme Court decision itself.

It is possible that the develop-

ment of the case and its influence have recorded correctly the
sentiments ot the eight Supreme Court justices who manifested the
national feeling at that time.

Reflecting the need to press the

Eighth Amendment into current service, the justices alao indicated
the hesitancy or conservative factions to push the new understanding too tar and too soon.

Therefore, the impact on later cases

has mirrored the guarded, ambivalent ruling in the Supreme Court.
224Joseph w. Bishop Jr. "The Warren Court Is Not Likely
To Be Overruled," Ht! Ygrk ~Lmes Magazi;e, September ? 1 1969 1 p. 92..
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From the earliest stages in the California state courts,
the question of the appropriateness of the Eighth Amendment had
been raised carefully.

That caution permitted flexibility which

has weakened substantially the force ot Robinson.

Through pro-

cedural and subtle, diversionary methods, the lower federal court
judges have avoided reaching decisions which supported or enlarged
the Supreme Court decision.
Generally, procedural tactics have been used to refuse to
hear petitions for writs of habeas corpus submitted by prisoners
serving convictions for laws similar to the California statute,
Section 11721 ot the California Health and Safety Code, or tor pre-

.

Robi!J!son sentences tor violation of that very law.
Those cases have not been decided on the merita of the
issue raised, but on the more basic question of standing in the
federal court system.

Opinions which declared that the petitioners

had not exhausted their state court remedies have f:ruatrated the
progress of the law with respect to crimes of statue.
In addition to procedural grounds• the decieiona have been
reached often in terms of the protective role of the federal courts
toward the state courts.

Justice Stewart•s concluding statement in

the majority opinion has prompted the federal court judges in two
cases. at least.

Connecticut and Louisiana statutes which punished

addiction have not been considered to be affected by the "individ-

70
ual provision of a particularized local law as it has so far been
interpreted

by

the California courts.n 225

Also, confinement of Robinson has been accomplished through
reasoning about the actions performed instead of the condition of
the person.

Weighed against a charge of a brutal physical. act, a

plea for not sentencing on the basis of involuntary status has

been inconsequential.
Mentioned in connection with Mr. Justice Douglas• opinion,
an alternative approach to the dilemma of involuntary status and
criminal action has been the use ot rehabilitative measures for the
convicted.

Instead of punishing wrong behavior, some of the lower

court justices have ordered treatreent of the persons through sentences in hospitals.

Through cooperation

or

the medical profession•

expert testimony has been introduced to show that the accused
were incompetent.
Handling status issues

by

passing the responsibility for

judging to physicians has not been successful in all cases,
Some of the persons who had been treated more humanely

by

however~

being

confined in mental institutions have sought legal aid to be transferred to penal institutions.

Although the public may ha.ve been

convinced that spending time in a hosp1t·e1 was an example of pro-

gressive jurisprudence, the recipients of that theory have not
been fooled.

225Robinson v. California, 370

u.s.

668(1962).
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Lon L. Fuller, in Anatomy of the Law, revealed the faulty
assumption made by judges who have given opinions which have
rendered men ill rather than wrong.
men in fact feel less shame in
be functioning badly than they do
broken the rules? One perceptive
it is more of an affront to human
compulsory .improvement than it is
Do

being f oraally declared to
in being found to have
observer has remarked that
dignity to sub~~it a man to
to punish him.

When the federal court justices have written opinions
which purportedly did not punish status, but assigned indeterminate confinement in institutions, they have been employing the
"variety of valid forms," 227 which included na program of compulsory treatment"228 that "might ,.require periods of involuntary
confinement 11 "229 outlined by Mr. Justice Stewart.
That "penal sanctions might be imposed for failure to
comply with established compulsory treatment procedure"230 has
been a suggestion followed by federal courts, also.

Construing

petitions from persons sentenced originally under unconstitutional
laws to be invalid because of violations of probation has been
questionable 11 but not challenged, however.
Another example of the variations in dealing with
Robinson has been the stressing of the duty of Congress to repeal
laws and to rewrite old ones when necessary.

226Lon L. Fuller.
Praeger, )968), 31.

The possible cruelty

Anatomy of the Law(Washington:

227Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66~()962).
228Ibid. 11 665.

229tbid.
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of sentencing a mother of minor, dependent children to five years
in prison for a first offense in a narcotics arrest has been
rationalized by a court which said that its duty is to administer
the laws that Congress has written in the Narcotic Control Act.
Robinson has not been accepted as an

overridi~g

principle.

Whenever an alternative to freeing a peraon accused of a
crime of status has been visible, the federal courts have taken
that option.

The basis for their ingenuity has been the majority

opinion and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas.

Aware-

ness of possible rejection by later courts and by the people in
general caused the five
soned decision.

justic~s

to agree on an extensively rea-

Mr. Justice Douglas tried to reinforce that

opinion.
Having anticipated the objections, the Supreme Court
justices prepared complex opinions with explicit ways to escape
the simple rule of Robinson.

Through this study of decisional

impact and constitutional development, it has been indicated that
greater adherence to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment would have been necessary to consistent federal and state court decisions since 1962 in cases involving questions of status if Robinson had been less conciliatory anc
more direct.

In conclusion, the Robinson case has been a means by which
the complex system of interaction among the United States courts
has been explored.

By following one case from its beginning in
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the state and federal courts through its decision in the Supreae
Court and impact on lower federal and $tate courts, the process of
interpretation, growth and reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment has been observed.
The study has emphasized that one Supreme Court decision
is neither the first nor the last opinion on a contemporary issue
before the nation.

The research has shown that legal decision-

making involves reaction to precedent as well as action on new
problems in a vital communication between the judges, who are
formulating opinions, and the people within this constitutional
government.

v
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